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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of rationality is both the origination point and the Achilles' 
heel of the study of human behavior in economics. The rationalist view of 
human nature is arguably the most pressing issue facing contemporary economics. 1 
Fields of knowledge other than economics have developed alternative theories 
of human activity to the neoclassical's pure economic man . They include Abraham 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Kenneth Boulding's "grants economy," and John 
Rawls' original position doctrine . Within economics, the Institutionalists have 
been the leading critics of the assumption that behavior in the economic sphere 
is rationally directed. 
A consensus view of rationality does not exist among Institutionalists. 
However. a synthesized Institutionalist conception of rationality would include 
the effects of culture, habit, social structure, and psychological makeup on 
individual and collective decisions. Additionally, an essential component of 
such a conceptualization would be the evolutionary aspect of rationalism, or 
how it develops throughout the life-process. These precepts are widely associated 
with the work of Thorstein Veblen and J. M Clark . 
1 James R. Wible, "Towards a Process Conception of Rationality in Economics 
and Science," Review of Social Economy. Vol. 42, No. 2 (October 1984): 89. 
Veblen primarily espoused a deterministic or "efficient cause" theory of 
human behavior, whereby class consciousness and anthropogenic factors are the 
forces of economic activity. 2 His denial of hedonistic calculation and implicit 
rejection of neoclassical utility functions are demonstrated by his statement: 
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightening 
calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a 
homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse 
of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. 8 
In his "Economics and Modern Psychology," J. M. Clark held that monetary 
interests and impulses drive economic decisions much more than anticipated 
increments of marginal satisfaction. Further, he questioned the costless assumption 
of the rational choice process and argued that the cost of intellectual effort is 
so great that individuals limit their exercise of free choice and defer to custom 
or habit:' 
This work is not designed to show that Schumpeter and Knight belong to 
the Institutional school of thought. Rather, Institutionalism provides a meaningful 
framework to compare their concepts of capitalistic and democratic rationality. 
Generally, both were dissatisfied with the assumption that individuals engage in 
rational calculation to satisfy wants of an unexplained origin. Their highly 
developed views of rationalistic civilization facilitate analysis of the considerable 
concordance as well as the conceptual differences which exist in their views of 
rationality. 
2Floyd B. McFarland, "Clarence Ayres and His Gospel of Technology," 
History of Political Economy, Vol. 18 (Winter, 1986): 618-21. 
8Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern 
Civilization and Other Essays (New York, 1919): 73-74. 
4J. M. Clark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," Preface to ~ 
Economics (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936): 100-102. 
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This essay examines their views of rationality through an exegesis of their 
writings in order to clarify a conception of rationality for modern economic 
science. It begins, therefore, by briefly discussing the intellectual sources and 
definitions of rationality according to Schumpeter and Knight. Then, a separate 
explication of the views Knight and Schumpeter held on capitalist and democratic 
rationality is presented. Finally, a synthesis of the methodological implications 
for economics is examined. 
SCHU:MPETER ON CAPITALIST AND DEMOCRATIC RATIONALITY 
Rationality in Capitalism 
To avoid confusion when using the verb "to rationalize," Schumpeter explains 
rationalizing as supplying ourselves and others with reasons for an action which 
satisfy our standard of values. 5 It is not necessary in his view that such reasons 
take into account the true impulses for the action. Actions which satisfy moral 
values, for an example, may actually be undertaken because economic benefits 
outweigh economic costs. 
He describes rationality in Marxian terms as the socio-psychological super-
structure of capitalism. It is the mentality which characterizes capitalist society 
and particularly the bourgeois class. He argues that primitive human economic 
necessities forced rationality upon the human mind and explains; "it is the every-
day economic task to which we as a race owe our elementary training in rational 
thought and behavior." 6 Further, he docs not hesitate to say that all logic is 
derived from the pattern of economic decisions. A phrase which Schumpeter is 
6Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, 
N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1942), p. 143 
6Ibid., p. 122 
3 
particularly fond of is: "the economic pattern is the matrix of logic." 7 Con-
sequently, as the unending rhythm of economic wants is satisfied, the rational 
thought process spreads and becomes ingrained in the decision making process . 
Thus, rationality is a learned response as opposed to innate, natural behavior. 
It is not Schumpeter's view that materialistic rationalism is new to capitalist 
activity. In fact, he suspects that pre-capitalist man was no less "grabbing" 
than capitalist man. However, he contends that capitalism has been the pro-
pelling force of the rationalization of human behavior. 
A capitalist institution which develops rationality is the exaltation of the 
monetary unit. The importance of money as a unit of account and as a measure 
in capitalist social stature systems facilitates rational cost-profit calculations. 
Cost-profit calculations, in Schumpeter's view, crystalize and define numerically 
economic rationality--in short, they "powerfully propel the logic of enterprise." 8 
Once rationality pervades the economic sector it influences and indeed sub-
jugates everything from man's outlook on Iif e to his concepts of beauty and 
justice. Even his spiritual ambitions are affected by the rationalizing propensity: 
the perceived benefits of the hereafter exceed the human costs of the here-and-
now. 
Once capitalism produces the rationalist mental process, the institution of 
democratic politics provides the means for nurturing society's rationalizing 
capabilities -- legislation. Schumpeter contends that capitalism produces both 
the means and the will to spread capitalist rationality. The spectacular increase 
in the modern standard of living for the masses, Schumpeter argues, encourages 
the development of more pervasive social programs. Perhaps, incidentally but 
7Ibid., p. 123 
8Ibid. 
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unquestionably, twentieth century public policy has simultaneously promoted 
social well being and facilitated the capacity to act rationally. Schumpeter 
asserts that the accompanying technological advances of modern science are 
the recognizable results of the rational-profit economy. He writes: 
Not only the modern mechanized plant and the volume of 
output that pours forth from it, not only modern technology 
and economic organization, but all the features and achieve-
ments of modern civilization are, directly or indirectly, 
the products of the capitalist process. 9 
Clearly Schumpeter is arguing that the institutional arrangements of the capitalist 
economic system require, promote and develop rationality. If rational human 
behavior takes place, then it is more the result of economic structure considera-
tions than advanced calculations of anticipated benefits and pleasures. 
Interestingly, rationalism--the cost-profit calculus of capitalism--does not 
insure the survival of market systems. Instead, it produces an "antiheroic" 
civilization; a society which pragmatically accepts the world this side of the 
grave. As capitalism exalts the rationalization process, the entrepreneurial 
spirit, which is imperative for the survival of the capitalist order, withers. 
Schumpeter holds that the material success of the capitalist economy favors 
the status quo. Thus, the revolutionary pattern of entrepreneurial activities 
will be replaced by logical bureaucratized management. 
In such an environment, innovation will be the responsibility "of teams of 
trained specialists who turn out what is required and make it work in predictable 
ways.RIO This, of course, is in many ways similar to Veblen's prediction of a 
"soviet of technicians." The renowned economic progress of capitalism inspired 
by individual entrepreneurship will become depersonalized and automatized. 
9Ibid., p. 125 
1°Ibid., p. 132 
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Vision will be replaced by rationalized and specialized office work. Schumpeter 
summarizes the dangers of these developments as follows: "Since capitalist 
enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automatize progress, we conclude 
that it tends to make itself superfluous--to break to pieces under the pressure 
of its own success." 11 
Intellectuals account for much of the criticism of the capitalist order, 
according to Schumpeter. He blames this situation on the emphasis on and the 
accessibility of higher education in the later stages of capitalist civilization. 
University education produces a surplus of quasi-professional intellectuals who 
may be simultaneously too ill-trained for professional employment and physically 
unemployable in manual occupations. Given this set of circumstances, employment 
may require acceptance of unsatisfactory working conditions and/or wages below 
skilled manual workers. This unemployed or unsatisfactorily employed population 
develops a thoroughly discontented attitude. In effect, the intellectual's 
indignation about the wrongs of capitalism represents a rationalization of his 
personal situation. 
Ultimately, discontented, employable intellectuals express their hostility 
through political party activities, staffing government agencies and acting as 
advisors to elected officials. In this way, Schumpeter asserts, as intellectuals 
impress their mentality on almost everything that gets done, public policy grows 
more and more hostile to capitalist interests. 12 The modern propensity for well-
11Ibid ., p. 134 
12Warren J. Samuels points out in "A Critique of Schumpeter," contained 
in Capitalism and Democracy Schumoeter Revisited (Notre Dame Press, 1985), 
that Schumpeter's prediction of the demise of capitalism is much more complex 
and subtle than his scapegoating of intellectuals. Specifically, Samuels 
argues, his criticism of rationalism and intellectuals is a stratagem for 
criticizing the corporate system's replacing individualist entrepreneurial 
capitalism as a system of economic control. 
6 
meaning social legislation may be indicative of this trend. 
The point is, rationality spawned by capitalism generates progress which 
ultimately creates a logic that undermines the essence of the system. In the 
face of spreading rationalism, capitalism cannot endure. In working so well, 
capitalism generates expectations based upon a rational belief in the possibility 
of a superior system. Ironically, when society behaves rationally and accepts 
the efficiency of an automated, bureaucratized production process, the results 
are perverse; the entrepreneurial spirit is undermined and the advance 
of socialism is hastened. In essence, rationalism, which is promoted by capitalism, 
leads to the acceptance of institutions which foster the development of socialism. 
Rationalism and Democracy 
The view of society's rationality held by Schumpeter is surely elitist and 
cynical. Most likely it is a product of his aristocratic, Austrian rearing. 13 He 
seems to have perceived only two types of man, the ordinary variety and the 
uncommonly gifted person. The former may behave rationally in daily matters 
at home and in business, but as voters, often prove themselves bad and indeed 
corrupt judges of their own interests. He contended: " ... the great political 
questions take their place in the psychic of the typical citizen with those 
leisure-hour interests that have not attained the rank of hobbies, and with the 
subjects of irresponsible conversation."1 4 Schumpeter's fundamental assumption 
regarding the relationship between the rational attitude and the State is that the 
capitalist process undermines its own institutional framework. Throughout his 
13L. A. O'Donnell, "Rationalism, Capitalism and the Entrepreneur: The 
Views of Veblen and Schumpeter," History of Political Economy. Vol. 5, No. I 
(Spring 1973): 202 
14Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism. and Democracy. p. 261 
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work, Schumpeter emphasizes the relevance of dynamics to real economic 
processes. Clearly, it is a process conception of socioeconomic rationality. 
The classical definition of democracy to Schumpeter is "an institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good 
by making the people decide issues through the election of individuals. . .. "16 
But, he contends, the classical state cannot exist. First, rational arguments 
cannot induce agreement upon a common good for all people. This is due to 
the fact that society's view of what life should be is beyond mere logic. 
Compromises are possible in some areas and impossible in others. Thus, it is 
impossible to discern a unique common good. Further, the idea of a "volonte 
generate" or common will of the people is easily dismissed, when one realizes 
all individual wills do not naturally gravitate toward a natural equilibrium even 
with rational discussion. In fact, the will of the people is the product of the 
political process. This manufactured will is the product of politicians or advocates 
of an economic interest who are able to fashion the will of the people. 
Schumpeter is exceedingly skeptical about human nature in politics. He 
doubts the common man's powers of observation and interpretation of facts as 
well as his ability to make rational inferences. He elaborates considerable 
evidence against the assumption of rationality inherent in the classical definition 
of democracy. Specifically, he points out that economists are learning that the 
consumers portrayed in textbooks do not have wants nearly as definite as assumed 
and do not act upon those wants in such a rational and prompt way. He suspects 
ordinary man is so susceptible to the influence of advertising that producers 
dictate to consumers rather than being directed by them. Schumpeter infers 
16Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. p. 250 
8 
from this state of affairs that extreme public gullibility exists in the realm of 
political action. 
When typical citizens enter the political field, Schumpeter suggests, they 
drop to a lower level of mental performance. In fact, the common man argues 
and analyzes in a manner which he would readily recognize as inf an tile within 
the sphere of his real, i.e., personal interests. In summary, the weakness of 
the rational process applied to politics, the absence of logical control over the 
arrived at results, and the relaxation of moral standards in political affairs 
render the ordinary citizen "more unintelligent and irresponsible than he usually 
is.1116 Thus, Schumpeter concludes that "the people" do not hold definite and 
rational opinions about every individual question and it is unlikely that they 
can elect representatives to carry out their opinions. 17 
KNIGHT ON RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
Individual Economic Rationality 
Frank Knight worked toward and hoped for a society based upon common-
sense rationality. Such a hope probably sprang from his mid-American roots. 18 
He acknowledged that the economic man exists, to some degree, in every person, 
but in the institutionalist tradition recognized that the romantic, the social 
animal, the prejudiced ignoramus exists alongside the calculating, self-interested 
individual. He rejected intellectual elitism and took it upon himself to expose 
16Ibid., p. 262 
17David McCord Wright, "Schumpeter's Political Philosophy," Schumpeter. 
Social Scientist (Freeport, New York: Libraries Press, 1969): 130-135 
18In a recent paper Donald Dewey presents, with a refreshing combination 
of genealogical and philosophical perspectives, a detailed and entertaining account 
of Knight's early years. Donald Dewey, "Frank Knight Before Cornell: Some 
Light on the Dark Years," paper presented at the 55th annual meeting of the 
Southern Economic Association, Dallas, November 25, I 985. 
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the fallacies, nonsense and absurdities in what is passed off as 
sophisticated-scientific discourse. Ultimately, he urged society to nurture the 
will to develop a more critical attitude. 
Knight sardonically notes: "That 'man is a rational animal' is one of those 
interesting statements which do not have to be proved, since the subject admits 
it."19 Even though man may hold such a view of himself, Knight considers the 
description to be too one-dimensional as well as generally false. To describe 
human beings as rational ignores the fundamental romantic element of human 
behavior. Further, Knight argues that the classical meaning of rationality is 
efficiency: the premeditated maximization of limited resources to achieve an 
envisioned end. In Knight's pursuit to emphasize man's romantic nature and to 
debunk social and economic dogma, he points out that humans seldom seek the 
"naked" and "cold" results of efficiency. Thus, man's view of himself as a 
rational creature is most likely a conviction based upon premises inferred from 
conclusions. (Man is rational because he is the highest order of reasoning 
animal.) Thus, Knight holds: "Man is certainly not the rational animal that 
he pretends to be . . . . He is very superior to other animals in reasoning 
power, but reason is not distinctive of man and is hardly his predominant trait; 
it is often used for irrational ends. 1120 
19Frank H. Knight, "The Planful Act: The Possibilities and Limitations 
of Collective Rationality," Freedom and Reform (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 
1982), p. 405 
2°Frank H. Knight, "The Free Society: Historical Background," Intelligence 
and Democratic Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 52 
10 
The clarification of the nature and significance of the economic man is 
perhaps Knight's major contribution to economic methodology. 21 He recognized 
that in order to build a rigorous and useful model of economic maximization 
man must be described as purposely and consciously utilizing means to attain 
predefined ends--the rational economic man. However. he also contends "there 
is no such man" because human beings do not know what they want--not to 
mention what is "good" for them--and do not act very intelligently to get the 
things which they have decided to acquire. Besides. to act completely rationally 
would require totally impersonal and non-romantic behavior which is not only 
"irrational" but impossible. Hence. he believed a science of conduct is an impos-
sibility because the data of conduct are provisional. shifting. and specific to 
individual situations to such a high degree that generalization is relatively 
fruitless. 22 Consequently. Knight always cautions against the overzealous applica-
tion of economic theory to sociological phenomenon and argues that economic 
theory is not an explanatory science of all reality. Perhaps. ironically. Knight's 
neoclassical link to modern positivist economics is the reinstatement of Knight's 
economic man. 
In order to understand the essence of Knight's institutional view of individual 
rationality and its place in economics, it is necessary to know the definition and 
description of rationality which was being promulgated by neo-classical economists 
in Knight's day. For, as he himself acknowledged, Frank Knight was essentially 
a critic and much of his work is a search for logical contradictions in economic 
21William Breitt, "Frank H. Knight - Philosopher of the Counter-Revolution 
in Economics," The Academic Scriblers (New York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1971 ), p. 200 
22Frank H. Knight, "Ethics and the Economic Interpretation," Ethics of 
Competition (Freeport, New York: Libraries Press, 1969), p. 35 
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theory. He saw his main task, and the task of general education, to be to 
"unteach" the acceptance of dogma and to develop the will to be intelligent, 
i.e., objective and critical. 
It appears that Frank Knight was not pleased with the course modern 
economics was taking. He particularly disapproved of the "economic" explanation 
of human behavior as well as attempts at predicting real world results from 
idealized theoretical economic models. Thus, he found Marshallian definitions 
of economics, viz., "the ordinary business of life" or "the science of rational 
activity," useless and misleading. 23 To Knight, such definitions suggested that 
economics is the science of everything that generally concerns mankind. On 
the one hand, economizing behavior does not encompass all human activity, and 
on the other, life must be much more than rational conduct or the intelligent 
use of resources to achieve pre-determined results. 
In the opening pages of The Economic Organization, he points out that 
common definitions of Economics are too broad, and the rational economic con-
ception of life is too narrow. He draws out the implications of the statement 
by noting: "Living intelligently includes more than the intelligent use of means 
in realizing ends; it is fully as important to select the ends intelligently, 
." and "Living is an art; and art is more than a matter of scientific technique, 
and the richness and value of life are largely bound up in the 'more.•"24 In 
this he concurs with John M. Clark that an irrational passion for dispassionate 
rationality would take all of the joy out of life. Although Knight was not a 
utopian, he expresses hope for a society where the everyday struggle to maximize 
23Frank H. Knight, The Economic Organization (New York, N.Y.: Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1933, 1951), p. 4 
24Ibid., pp. 3-4 
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the production of material necessities will give way to a culture devoted to 
problems of truth, improved human relations, and beauty. 
Collective Rationality and Democracy 
In his essay, "Can the Mind Solve the Problems Raised by Its Liberation," 
Knight recognizes the tendencies released by liberal culture toward "acute dis-
content, criticism, and fault-finding."2 6 He infers, much like Schumpeter, that 
favorable capitalist conditions have caused a critical attitude to develop with 
astonishing speed as a culture trait. He concedes that the propensity to dissent 
against economic and political conditions has existed all along but speculates it 
was held in check by the harsh discipline of precapitalist-preliberal culture. 
Knight is probably as skeptical as Schumpeter about the possibility of 
society making rational political selections in a democracy. In dealing with 
the existence of collective rationality in a democracy, Knight, as always, is 
attempting to show something of the complexity and difficulty of accepting 
traditional truths. He recognizes that collective rationality in a democracy 
involves rationally delegating power. This implies: the will and intellect exist 
to choose a representative; the mechanics to rationally select an agent are 
operational; once selected, the agent is given instructions concerning the process 
to use in order to achieve a rational end; and a means must exist for holding 
the agent responsible for carrying out the instructions. Using an analogy whereby 
a patient must choose a physician, Knight expresses his reservations concerning 
the public's ability to rationally choose political leadership. 
26Frank H. Knight, "Can the Mind Solve the Problems Raised by Its Libera-
tion," Intelligence and Democratic Action (see No. 14), p. 144 
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First, it is impossible for a leader to be selected intelligently, 
in the scientific sense. In order to select his doctor scientifically, 
the patient would have to know all the medical science known 
by all the candidates under consideration, and in addition know 
how much of this knowledge was possessed by each separate 
candidate. Secondly, the relation between leader and follower 
must be a moral relation, one of confidence and trust on the 
part of the client and of moral integrity and of candor tempered 
by judgment on the part of the counsellor. Thirdly, where the 
leader is chosen by the follower or client on the basis of active 
competition for the position, the follower becomes the real 
leader; for the methods of competition by those seeking appoint-
ment will run largely to competition in promising to do what 
the client wants done, and by debating technical details will 
make him the judge of these, and to promising results of whose 
probability of realization the counsel-seeker must judge. And 
all this is the more certainly true where the follower is a group, 
amenable to manipulation through crowd psychology. Fourthly, 
active competition for positions of leadership, especially leadership 
of groups of considerable size, means the progressive degradation 
of the entire system through the use of salesmanship or 
"influence,"--flattcry, cajolery, outright deception, and sheer 
pressure of suggestion and assertion. This means appeal from 
intelligence to the most irrational emotions. The methods of 
competition adopted by aspirants to positions of leadership must 
be those which "work"; candidates in any way restrained by 
"principles" will simply be eliminated. And it goes without saying 
that competence to persuade is only accidentally and improbably 
associated with competence to counsel and to lead. 26 
Clearly, Knight thought that due to human nature and the complexity of modern 
decisions there are very narrow limits to the achievement of collective rationality. 
He argued that in the political field the possibility of knowledge adequate for 
rational group action is extremely limited. 
Even though Knight is skeptical about the possibility of collective rationality, 
he holds that intelligent social action is distinctly possible. In fact, Knight 
contends that in a truly democratic system men must use freedom intelligently 
and intelligent is preferable to rational. 
26Knight, "Economic Theory and Nationalism: Ethics of 
Competition. pp. 304-305 
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The first step in Knight's system for intelligent social action is to compare 
the alternatives, beginning with understanding what they are. This procedure 
must logically be conducted prior to action. After knowledge of alternatives 
and conditions is assimilated, it is possible to proceed to the second stage of 
the analytical process of social reform: the formulation of an ideal or a rationally 
desired end. To Knight, it is imperative that reformers have a detailed view 
of the consequences of change before action is undertaken. The final task in 
Knight's model for undertaking intelligent social action is to decide the appropriate 
means for social change. Knight is quick to point out that inaction and the 
"natural" course of events may be the best alternative. His basic axiom is that 
it is better not to act unless it can be done intelligently because the chances 
are good that harmful results will follow from acting randomly--or unintelligently. 
In summary, Knight concurred with Lord Bryce that democracy should 
ideally be "government by discussion." Thus, in a Jeffersonian sense, Knight 
held that the cost of freedom is intellectual initiative and the will to use 
intelligence intelligently. 
15 
Summary and Methodological Implications 
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Schumpeter contends that the •matrix of logic" in economic life is rationality; 
the socio-psychological superstructure of capitalism is founded upon rational 
cost-profit calculations; and, rationalism inspires an almost universal hostility 
to capitalism which will promote the demise of the capitalist system. As an 
evolutionist, Schumpeter believes rationality develops as institutions of the 
capitalist economic system take shape. Money facilitates the cost-profit calculus, 
and social legislation fosters both the economic status and the cognitive ability 
to act rationally. Also, the Schumpeterian concept of rationality includes the 
importance of social-cultural interactions as class affects •rational• economic 
decisions. 
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The view of rationality held by Knight is more sanguine than Schumpeter's. 
Knight argues that life is more than economics and rational conduct, and that 
living intelligently requires more than acting rationally toward unexplained 
ends. Further, in Knighfs view most economic activity is rivalrous and conten-
tious, and, thus, irrational. He thoroughly proves the irrationality of complete 
rationality with his description of the "economic man." He also contends that 
liberal culture's "liberation of the mind" releases a tendency to be critical of 
capitalist relations. Ultimately, Knight replaces economic calculation with critical 
intelligence as the imperative mental process for democratic economic and political 
action. 
The popularization of rational-expectations macroeconomics (REM) has 
rekindled interest in defining rational individual economic actions. In fact, the 
economic policy debate between rational-expectations theorists and Keynesians 
is founded on the controversy over efficient formulation of rational expectations. 
REM theorists contend that existing Keynesian macroeconomic models cannot 
provide reliable guidance in the formulation of monetary or fiscal policy. The 
fundamental assumption of REM is that people make rational choices based 
upon the latest available data and the best available economic theory. The 
striking macroeconomic policy implications of such a postulate is that government 
cannot "fool" the people and, hence, countercyclical policies will not \affect 
macroeconomic performance. 
The theoretical synthesis presented in this study of Schumpeter and Knight's 
i 
. I 
views on individual and collective rationality suggests that the average citizen/-
consumer is less than an unbiased and efficient information processor; there is 
no rational economic man. The macroeconomic policy implication of these findings 
' 
is that predictable government policies can affect employment and output. : 
17 
Further, the unlikelihood of rational utility maximization noted by Schumpeter 
and Knight undermines the microeconomic assumption of rationality and warrants 
further methodological consideration. Perhaps Samuelson's consumer theory 
whereby individuals are consistent in their tastes and actions is the appropriate 
assumption for modeling behavior and should be further developed. To conclude, 
if policy recommendations are to be based upon economic theory, then assumptions 
about rationality must be realistic. Likewise, if microeconomic models of utility 
maximization are to be useful, a thorough understanding of consumer rationality 
is imperative. An awareness of the concepts of Schumpeter and Knight on 
individual and collective rationality should contribute to such a realistic 
understanding of rationality for the science of economics. 
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